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Abstract
For more than three decades healthcare decentralization has been promoted in developing countries as a way of 
improving the financing and delivery of public healthcare. Decision autonomy under healthcare decentralization would 
determine the role and scope of responsibility of local authorities. Jalal Mohammed, Nicola North, and Toni Ashton 
analyze decision autonomy within decentralized services in Fiji. They conclude that the narrow decision space allowed to 
local entities might have limited the benefits of decentralization on users and providers. To discuss the costs and benefits 
of healthcare decentralization this paper uses the U-form and M-form typology to further illustrate the role of decision 
autonomy under healthcare decentralization. This paper argues that when evaluating healthcare decentralization, it is 
important to determine whether the benefits from decentralization are greater than its costs. The U-form and M-form 
framework is proposed as a useful typology to evaluate different types of institutional arrangements under healthcare 
decentralization. Under this model, the more decentralized organizational form (M-form) is superior if the benefits 
from flexibility exceed the costs of duplication and the more centralized organizational form (U-form) is superior if the 
savings from economies of scale outweigh the costly decision-making process from the center to the regions. Budgetary 
and financial autonomy and effective mechanisms to maintain local governments accountable for their spending 
behavior are key decision autonomy variables that could sway the cost-benefit analysis of healthcare decentralization. 
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Introduction
Healthcare reform is currently one of the main priorities of 
governments around the world, as developing and developed 
countries experience population aging and raising healthcare 
costs. Since the 1980s, healthcare decentralization has been a 
popular tool of healthcare reforms. Healthcare decentralization 
has usually been portrayed as a way of increasing efficiency 
on healthcare financing and delivery. The flexibility of 
decentralized health services is perceived as superior to the 
rigidities and failures of ‘Stalinist’ centralized planning, since 
local knowledge can be used to address local needs and 
tastes.1 From a theoretical perspective, decentralized health 
services have additional advantages. They are less exposed 
to the political and budgetary considerations that affect 
central policy-making if decentralized governments have full 
decision-making autonomy and effective revenue collection 
mechanisms.2 Underrepresented regions or populations 
overlooked by central governments might be better off once 
the administration of health services is devolved to local 
communities. 
Advocates of decentralization argue that market failures in 
the health sector and regional disparities, which could justify 
healthcare centralization in the first place, can be addressed in 
decentralized institutional frameworks. These models should 
contain the right incentives, resource transfers and better 
coordination across different government levels.3 In practice, 
it is politically sensitive and time consuming to set these 
systems in place. Thus, it is still an open question whether 
providing basic health services in developing countries is 
better under a decentralized system. Jalal Mohammed, Nicola 
North, and Toni Ashton investigate the role of decision space 
within decentralized services using Fiji as a case study.4 Their 
contribution shows how decision space can be systematically 
assessed to better characterize healthcare decentralization 
efforts. They argue that decentralization can occur along 
different domains and the specific decision-making 
arrangements between central and local authorities might 
explain the success or failure of healthcare decentralization. 
In general, the academic literature has ambivalent conclusions 
about the outcome of healthcare decentralization.5-7 Several 
contributions argue that decentralization neither increased 
local government healthcare finances, nor improved equity, 
quality or efficiency of publicly run health services.5,8 In many 
cases it had the opposite effect, as performance deteriorated 
due to financial constraints, poor managerial skills at the local 
level, and supply failures.6 However, studies acknowledge 
some positive effects mainly in areas where community 
participation became more active and in some regions that 
traditionally devoted more resources to healthcare and were 
eager to get local autonomy to administer these resources 
better.9
One methodological challenge in the healthcare decentralization 
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literature is its failure to isolate the effect of decentralization 
from the overall consequences of economic adjustment. 
Several decentralization experiments occurred in periods of 
deep economic crisis.5,8 Consequently, most empirical studies 
overestimate the negative impacts of decentralization policies 
and cannot disentangle the impact of decentralization 
by itself. Very few studies have been able to use natural 
experiments to isolate the impact of economic adjustment 
from healthcare decentralization.10,11 Recent decentralization 
efforts have been implemented in more stable political and 
economic environments. The study by Mohammed, North, 
and Ashton uses an interesting case study where an initial 
decentralization effort was pushed back for different external 
factors. One year later, a different devolution process was 
implemented. By contrast with the first decentralization 
effort, less decision authority was devolved to the local entities 
in the second period. Future research should take advantage 
of this potential source of exogenous change in health policy 
to measure the impact of each type of decentralization model 
on access to care and health outcomes. 
A source of confusion in the healthcare decentralization 
literature is the lack of specificity on the conceptual definition 
of healthcare decentralization. Deconcentration, delegation, 
devolution, and privatization are administrative changes that 
are commonly mislabeled as healthcare decentralization by 
academics and policy-makers.12 Deconcentration is a shift 
on responsibility from the center to the periphery within an 
organization structure, delegation and devolution reallocates 
authority in separate government entities or sub-national 
governments. Privatization transfers ownership and sometimes 
responsibility to private agents. The study by Mohammed, 
North, and Ashton argues that the first decentralization period 
in Fiji could fit better its traditional definition. By contrast, 
the more recent devolution arrangement could be better 
characterized as deconcentration, since decision autonomy 
on finances, service organization, human resources, access 
rules, and governance remained highly centralized. Under 
the new arrangement, local authorities lacked the autonomy 
required to operate differently from other regions because the 
central government controlled the main sources of funding 
and determined allocation rules. 
M-Form vs. U-Form and Decision Autonomy After Healthcare 
Decentralization
The authors argue that the current administrative 
arrangement in Fiji might not be taking advantage of 
healthcare decentralization since local authorities lacked 
decision autonomy. The theory of organizations can be useful 
to better understand decision autonomy under healthcare 
decentralization arrangements. The M-form (multidivisional 
form) and U-form (unitary form) are two categories widely 
applied in industrial organization.13,14 This typology has been 
used to contrast different types of government arrangements 
and institutional frameworks in the comparative economics 
literature.15 While the U-form resembles a highly centralized 
administrative structure, the M-form fits the description of a 
decentralized arrangement.1
This framework can be applied to better understand the 
diversity of healthcare decentralization reforms. For example, 
it can be used to compare decision autonomy under different 
 
models of healthcare decentralization. In the U-form system, 
the central government has the authority and responsibility of 
delivering healthcare (Figure 1). A top manager coordinates 
its provision through intermediate managers who are solely 
responsible for operating public healthcare facilities. In Figure 
1, Manager 1 is in charge of a specialized public service, say 
distribute prescription drugs, in two regions (A and B). 
Similarly, Manager 2 is responsible of another public service, 
for example prescribing drugs, in the same two regions (A 
and B). 
In the M-form, the central entity devolves the decision-
making authority and responsibility for providing a public 
service to regional or local managers (Figure 2). As they 
are closer to their constituencies, these administrative units 
are also accountable for operating the two health services, 
distribute and prescribe pharmaceuticals. In contrast with the 
U-Form, in Figure 2 Manager 1 is in charge of both activities, 
distributing and prescribing drugs, in one region (A) only. 
Similarly, Manager 2 is responsible for the two activities in 
the second region (B). The central government keeps some 
oversight functions to insure that all citizens receive similar 
bundles of public services across regions. Central managers 
can pursue this goal by evaluating regional performance and 
assisting under-performers. In addition, they can encourage 
regional managers to cooperate in areas where they could take 
advantage of some economies of scale, for example, in bidding 
for better pharmaceutical prices with suppliers. 
Various theoretical assessments on the cost and benefits of 
U-Form and M-Form organizations show a trade-off between 
these models.1,15 The M-form benefits from better use of local 
information, but forgoes economies of scale that give the 
U-form lower operation costs. The costly duplication of health 
services (1, 2) in each region (A, B) of the M-form model does 
not exist in the U-form model, as each manager specializes 
Figure 1. U-Form Organization of a Centralized Public Service.
Figure 2. M-Form Organization of a Centralized Public Service.
 
Bustamante
International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2016, 5(9), 561–563 563
in one public service for the two regions. The decentralized 
organization, however, has an advantage in flexibility. As they 
are closer to their constituency, intermediate managers in the 
M-form are able to respond rapidly to shifts on local demand. 
From the perspective of the central manager, it is also possible 
to experiment with different provision models across regions. 
Managers 1 and 2 in the U-form lack decision autonomy, 
since it is mostly centralized. The decision-making process 
from the center to the regions can be slow and inefficient, as 
circumstances change fast. Thus, the M-form is superior if 
the benefits from flexibility exceed the costs of duplication. 
The U-form is better if the savings from economies of scale 
outweigh the costly process of information transmittal to/
from the center.1 In this cost-benefit analysis, decision space is 
endogenous to the model. Under the M-form administrative 
structure, local governments have full budgetary and financial 
autonomy, including revenue collection autonomy. The role 
of the central manager is minimal, limiting its oversight to 
measuring performance and promoting cooperation. Local 
governments with the administrative capacity to mobilize 
local resources effectively would benefit the most from 
decentralization. By contrast, impoverished regions with 
limited resources or low capacity to mobilize them effectively 
would benefit the least from more decision autonomy.
Under the U-form administrative structure, the central 
government has full budgetary and decision autonomy, and 
it is the single revenue collection entity. In this arrangement, 
the role of the local manager is minimal, limiting its actions 
to implementing policies and programs decided at the center, 
using resources that are also transferred from the center even 
if a share of those resources were collected locally. In fact, this 
costly and inefficient process of information and resource 
transfer is a key element that would sway the cost-benefit 
analysis of healthcare centralization. Central governments 
with administrative capacity to respond rapidly to changing 
local circumstances are more likely to benefit from healthcare 
centralization. By contrast, inflexible central government 
responses that clash with heterogeneous and rapidly changing 
regional realities would benefit the least from centralizing 
decision-making. 
In reality, recent healthcare decentralization efforts combine 
features from both organizational forms. Institutional 
arrangements after healthcare decentralization often times 
create shared decision space arrangements between local 
and central authorities. Budgetary and financial autonomy 
and effective mechanisms to maintain local governments 
accountable are key decision autonomy variables that would 
determine whether shared decision arrangements are effective 
after healthcare decentralization.
Since the early 2000s Fiji has transition from a U-form to 
an M-form administrative structure even though decision 
autonomy remains centralized in its current organizational 
form. The study by Mohammed, North, and Ashton concludes 
that the narrow decision space allowed to decentralized 
entities on the recent healthcare deconcentration in Fiji might 
limit the benefits of decentralization for users and providers. 
According to the proposed U-Form vs. M-Form model the 
advantage of centralized decision autonomy (eg, reduce 
regional disparities, economies of scale) should outweigh 
the advantages of flexibility and local knowledge in order 
to be efficient. An empirical assessment of the two types of 
decentralization models implemented in Fiji would be useful 
to better assess the costs and benefits of decentralization. 
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